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Abstract: Like many routing protocols, the Tor
anonymity network has decentralized path selection, in
clients locally and independently choose paths. As a re-
sult, network resources may be left idle, leaving the sys-
tem in a suboptimal state. This is referred to as the price
of anarchy, where agents acting in their own self interest
can make poor decisions when viewed in a global con-
text. In this paper we explore the cost of anarchy in Tor
by examining the potential performance increases that
can be gained by centrally optimizing circuit and relay
selection using global knowledge. In experiments with
both offline and online algorithms, we show that cen-
trally coordinated clients can achieve up to 75% higher
bandwidth compared to traditional Tor. Drawing on
these findings, we design and evaluate a decentralized
version of our online algorithm, in which relays locally
distribute information enabling clients to make smarter
decisions locally and perform downloads 10-60% faster.
Finally, we perform a privacy analysis of the decentral-
ized algorithm against a passive and active adversary
trying to reduce anonymity of clients and increase their
view of the Tor network. We conclude that this decen-
tralized algorithm does not enable new attacks, while
providing significantly higher performance.
1 Introduction
Tor [7] is one of the most popular and widely used low-
latency anonymity systems, with 2 million daily clients
supported by a network of over 6000 volunteer relays.
Tor clients tunnel traffic through a sequence of 3 relays
called a circuit. Traffic sent over the circuit is encrypted
so that no single relay can learn the identity of both
the client and destination. With a limited amount of re-
sources available from the volunteer relays, it is impor-
tant to distribute traffic to utilize these resources as ef-
ficiently as possible. Doing so ensures high performance
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to latency sensitive applications and attracts potential
clients to use the network, increasing anonymity for all
users.
Similar to ordinary routing, clients make decisions
locally based on their view of the network. In Tor, direc-
tory authorities are centralized servers that keep track
of all relays and their information. Clients download
this information, stored in consensus files and server
descriptors, every few hours from the directory author-
ities. With this information clients create 10 circuits to
have available, selecting relays for the circuits at ran-
dom weighted by the relays bandwidth. When the client
starts using Tor to send traffic, it then selects the circuit
in best standing to use for the next 10 minutes. Since
it can take the directory authority up to 24 hours to
properly update relay information and distribute it to
clients, much research has focused on how clients can
make better decisions, such as considering latency [2] or
relay congestion [37] when selecting relays and circuits.
The main issue with leaving network decisions to
clients is that local incentives can lead clients to make
decisions that they believe will maximize their perfor-
mance, when actually these decisions result in a global
sub-optimal state with overall client performance suffer-
ing. In these situations it is common to compare what
happens when decisions are made with global knowl-
edge. This can be achieved by centrally processing re-
quests as they are made, or performing decisions offline
when the entire set of requests is known a priori. The
performance gap that results from using decentralized
compared to centralized decision making is called the
price of anarchy.
While Tor clients are not necessarily selfish, they
are making local decisions without context of the state
of the global network. In this paper we analyze the price
of anarchy in the Tor network. We develop both offline
and online centralized algorithms that optimize relay
and circuit selection decisions made by clients. Using
the global view of all active circuits in the Tor network,
the algorithms are able to more intelligently select which
circuits clients should use for each download they per-
form, resulting in significant performance improvements
to clients. While these are not necessarily protocols that
should be run in practice, it allows us to bound the ac-
tual price of anarchy in Tor. This demonstrates the po-
tential improvements that better resource allocation in
Tor could achieve.
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In this paper we make the following major contri-
butions:
– Using a modified client model, we create a genetic
algorithm to compute the optimal offline circuit se-
lection for a given sequence of download requests.
Since the algorithm is given access to the full se-
quence of requests before processing, this allows us
to establish the optimal performance for a given net-
work and load. This serves as a baseline for the com-
petitive analysis of other algorithms.
– In addition, we develop an online centralized al-
gorithm that processes download requests serially.
Based on a delay-weighted capacity routing algo-
rithm the centralized circuit selection tries to avoid
low bandwidth bottlenecks when assigning circuits
to requests.
– Using techniques from the centralized algorithm, we
develop a decentralized algorithm that results in
similar resource allocations, with relays releasing a
small amount of information to allow clients to make
smarter circuit selection choices.
– We perform privacy analysis on the decentralized
circuit selection algorithm that considers both in-
formation that can be learned from a passive adver-
sary, and examines how an active adversary could
attempt to abuse the algorithm to increase their
view of the network.
– All algorithms are analyzed in a large scale simu-
lated environment using the Shadow simulator [15].
This allows us to precisely compare the effects and
performance gains achieved across the different cir-
cuit selection algorithms.
2 Background
In this section we discuss some of the Tor architec-
ture, basics on how the clients operate and send data
through the network, and related work on increasing
performance in Tor.
2.1 Tor Architecture
When a client first joins the Tor network, it downloads
a list of relays with their relevant information from a
directory authority. The client then creates 10 circuits
through a guard, middle, and exit relay. The relays used
for each circuit are selected at random weighted by
bandwidth. For each TCP connection the client wishes
to make, Tor creates a stream which is then assigned
to a circuit; each circuit will typically handle multiple
streams concurrently. The Tor client will find a viable
circuit that can be used for the stream, which will be
then be used for the next 10 minutes or until the circuit
becomes unusable.
Internal to the overlay network, relay pairs establish
a single TLS connection for all communication between
them. To send traffic through a circuit, data is packed
into 512-byte onion-crypted cells using secret keys ne-
gotiated with each relay during the circuit building pro-
cess. Once a relay has received a cell, it peels off its layer
of encryption, finds the next relay on the circuit to send
to, and places it on a circuit queue where it waits to
be sent. After a cell has traversed the entire circuit, the
exit recovers the initial data sent by the client and is
forwarded to the end destination.
2.2 Related Work
One of the major keys to increasing anonymity for Tor
users is ensure a large anonymity set, that is, a large
user base. To do so Tor needs to offer low latency to
the clients; bad performance in the form of slow web
browsing can lead to fewer users using the system over-
all. To this end, there has been a plethora of research
looking to address ways to increase performance in Tor.
These roughly fall into 4 areas: scheduling, selection,
transports, and incentives.
Scheduling: Internally Tor is constantly making
scheduling decisions on what to send and how much
should be processed. These decisions happen on all lev-
els, between streams, circuits, and connections. On the
circuit level, much work has been done in an attempt
to classify latency sensitive circuits, either prioritizing
them [3, 35] or outright throttling noisy ones [18]. With
regards to deciding how much should be sent on a
circuit, there has been work comparing Tor’s end-to-
end window algorithm with an ATM-style link-based
algorithm [4]. Additional work [14] has been done on
scheduling across circuits from all connections, limiting
how much is written to a connection at a time so Tor
has more control over what gets sent, opposed to the
kernel.
Selection: When creating circuits, Tor selects from re-
lays at random weighted by their bandwidth. Determin-
ing the bandwidth is a non-trivial issue, and much work
[33, 34] has been done looking at a range of methods,
from using self-reported values, central nodes making
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direct measurements, and peer-to-peer methods relying
on existing relays. There also has been a lot of research
in improving the relay selection [2, 6, 12, 31, 32, 36, 37]
for circuit creation. These range from incorporating la-
tency and congestion measurements, using a virtual co-
ordinate system, to adjusting the weighting strategy, all
in an attempt improve overall client performance.
Transport: One of the noted performance issues in
Tor is the fact that the single TLS connection between
relays can cause unnecessary blocking, where circuits
could keep sending data but TCP mechanisms prevent
it [8]. Reardon [26] attempted to address this by im-
plementing TCP-over-DTLS allowing a connection to
be dedicated to each circuit. In a similar vein, there has
been numerous work [5, 9, 10] looking into increasing the
number of TCP connections between relays and schedul-
ing circuits between them in an attempt to avoid un-
neccessary blocking. Nowlan et al.introduce uTCP and
uTLS[23, 24] , which allows for out-of-order delivery in
Tor so it can process cells from circuits that are not
blocking.
Incentives: While the previous lines of research in-
volved improving efficiency in how Tor handles traffic,
another set looked at potential ways to incentive clients
to also contribute bandwidth as a relay, increasing the
overall network resources available to clients. This was
first explored by Ngan, Dingledine, and Wallach [22],
where they would prioritize traffic from relays providing
high quality service in the Tor network. Jansen, Hopper,
and Kim [16] extend this idea, allowing relays to earn
credits which can be redeemed for higher prioritized
traffic. Building on this, Jansen, Johnson, and Syverson
[17] introduce a more lightweight solution that allows
for the same kind of prioritization of traffic without as
much overhead.
3 Experimental Setup
To maximize our understanding of performance in the
Tor network, we want to run large scale experiments
that accurately represent the actual operations of Tor
clients and relays. To this end we use Shadow [1, 15],
a discrete event network simulator with the capability
to run actual Tor code in a simulated network environ-
ment. Shadow allows us to setup a large scale network
configuration of clients, relays, and servers, which can
all be simulated on a single machine. This lets us run ex-
periments privately without operating on the actual Tor
network, avoiding potential privacy concerns of dealing
with real users. Additionally, it lets us have a global
view and precise control over every aspect of the net-
work, giving us insights and capabilities into Tor that
would be near impossible to achieve in a live network.
Most importantly, Shadow performs deterministic runs,
allowing for reproducible results and letting us isolate
exactly what we want to test for performance effects.
Our experiments are configured to use Shadow
v1.9.2 and Tor v0.2.5.10. We use the large network con-
figuration deployed with Shadow which consists of 500
relays, 1350 web clients, 150 bulk clients, 300 perfor-
mance clients, and 500 servers. The default client model
in Shadow [13–15] has clients download a file of a spe-
cific size, and after the download is finished it chooses
how long to pause until it starts the next download.
Web clients download 320 KB files and will randomly
pause between 1 and 60,0000 milliseconds until it starts
the next download. Bulk clients download 5 MB files
with no break in between downloads. The performance
clients are split into three groups, downloading 50 KB,
1 MB, and 5 MB files, then pausing 1 minute between
each download it performs. Along with the default client
model we also consider a new type of client model called
the fixed download model. Instead of clients having a
single start time and inter-download pause times, they
have a list of downloads with each download having a
unique start time and end time. To create a fixed down-
load experiment we extract the start and stop times for
all client downloads from a default client run and use
those as the base for the fixed download experiment.
For measuring performance between experiments we
examine different metrics depending on which client
model is being used. For the default client model we look
at the time to first byte and download times of web and
bulk clients along with the total read bandwidth across
all clients in the network. When using the new fixed
download model, download times lose meaning as they
have fixed start and end times. The major metric that
will change between experiments is the amount of data
being pushed through the Tor network, so total client
read bandwidth is the only metric we consider when
using the fixed download model.
4 Price of Anarchy
The price of anarchy [29] refers to situations where
decentralized decision making can lead a system into
a sub-optimal configuration due to the selfish nature
of agents participating in the system. In networking
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Fig. 1. Example of circuit bandwidth estimate algorithm. Each step the relay with the lowest bandwidth is selected, its bandwidth evenly
distributed among any remaining circuit, with each relay on that circuit having their bandwidth decremented by the circuit bandwidth.
this problem is specifically referred to as selfish rout-
ing [28, 30], where users select routes based on a local
optimization criteria (latency, bandwidth, etc.) result-
ing in a sub-optimal global solution due to potential
conflicting interests. While clients in Tor are not neces-
sarily selfish, as they select relays at random weighted
by their bandwidth, they are oblivious with respect to
relay and network conditions. In that sense, localized de-
cision making with respect to relays and circuits has the
potential to lead to a sub-optimal result, where network
resources are left idle which could be used to increase
client performance.
To fully explore the price of anarchy in Tor we want
to examine just how much of a performance increase can
be achieved if we have some centralized authority mak-
ing decisions rather than the clients themselves. For this
we consider both an offline algorithm, which is able to
see the entire set of download requests when operating,
and an online algorithm which needs to process inputs
serially and is unaware of future requests. In this section
we detail how each of these algorithms work and look
at any potential performance benefits.
4.1 Offline Algorithm
An offline algorithm needs access to the entire input
set while operating, in this case that means knowing
the times of when each client is active and perform-
ing a download. So instead of using the default client
model in Shadow, we use the fixed download model
which gives us a list of all download start and stop
times in the experiment. From the experimental setup
we extract all downloads di with their corresponding
start and end times (si, ei), along with the list of re-
lays rj and their bandwidth bwj . These parameters are
then passed into the offline algorithm which returns a
mapping di → ci(ri1 , ri2 , ri3) of downloads and a circuit
consisting of three relays which should be used by the
client performing the download. Note that we still use
the constraints from Tor that all relays in the circuit
must be unique and that ri3 must be an exit relay, but
we do not force the algorithm to select ri1 to be a guard.
This is done since it is impossible to use a non-exit as
an exit relay, however there is no mechanism to enforce
the guard in a circuit actually has the guard flag set.
When using the fixed download client model the of-
fline circuit selection problem starts to strongly resem-
ble job scheduling [11]. For example, we have a set of
downloads (jobs) that have to be processed on three re-
lays (machines). Each download has a start time (release
date), and can either have an end time (due date) or a
file of specific size to download (number of operations).
The relays can process downloads simultaneously (jobs
can be preempted) and the goal is to download each file
as fast as possible (minimize complete time or lateness).
There are some complications in how exactly to define
the machine environment for job scheduling, since the
relays are heterogeneous and the fact that the amount
of processing done on a relay is determined by the bot-
tleneck in the circuit and not necessarily the bandwidth
capacity of the relay. We would definitely need an al-
gorithm which handled job splitting across machines,
as we need 3 relays processing a download, and these
problems seem to be often NP-hard.
Due to these complications we instead develop a ge-
netic algorithm in order to compute a lower-bound of an
optimal offline solution. Our genetic algorithm will have
a population of solutions with a single solution consist-
ing of a complete mapping of downloads to circuits. We
can breed two solutions by iterating through each down-
load and randomly choosing a circuit from either parent.
However, the most important part of a genetic algorithm
is a fitness function allowing us to score each solution.
Since the metric we are most concerned with in the fixed
download client model is the amount of bandwidth be-
ing pushed through the network, we want a method for
estimating the total amount of network bandwidth used
given a mapping of downloads to circuits.
In order to calculate the total bandwidth across an
entire set of downloads, we first need a method for cal-
culating the circuit bandwidth across a set of active cir-
cuits at a single point of time. To do this we make two
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Algorithm 1 Estimate bandwidth of active circuits
1: function CalcCircuitBW(activeCircuits)
2: activeRelays← GetRelays(activeCircuits)
3: while not activeCircuits.empty() do
4: r ← GetBottleneckRelay(activeRelays)
5: circuits← GetCircuits(activeCircuits, r)
6: circuitBW ← r.bw/circuits.len()
7: for c ∈ circuits do
8: c.bw ← circuitBW
9: for circRelay ∈ c.relays do
10: circRelay.bw −= c.bw
11: if circRelay.bw = 0 then
12: activeRelays.remove(circRelay)
13: end if
14: end for
15: activeCircuits.remove(c)
16: end for
17: end while
18: end function
observations: (1) bottleneck relays will determine the
bandwidth of the circuit, and (2) that a relay will split
its bandwidth equally among all circuits it is the bottle-
neck on. The first observation comes from the end-to-
end window based congestion control algorithm used in
Tor, ensuring clients and exit relays only send as much
as a circuit can handle. The second observation isn’t
trivially true, since with the priority circuit scheduler
some circuits will be sending more than others on a
small enough time interval. In aggregate though all cir-
cuits will be given roughly the same amount of band-
width.
The pseudocode for calculating the circuit band-
width across a set of active circuits is shown in Algo-
rithm 1 and works as follows. First the algorithm iden-
tifies the relay r with the lowest bandwidth per circuit
(line 4). We know this relay is the bottleneck on all cir-
cuits that r appears on, as by definition every other relay
on the circuit will have a higher available circuit band-
width. Next the algorithm iterates through each circuit
ci that r appears on and assigns the circuit bandwidth
as r’s per circuit bandwidth (lines 5-8). In addition, for
each ci the algorithm also iterates over each relay rij
on circuit ci, decrementing the bandwidth of rij by the
circuit bandwidth assigned to circuit ci (line 10). While
iterating over the relays, if any of them runs out of avail-
able bandwidth, the relay is removed from the list of
active relays (lines 11-13). After we have iterated over
the relays in circuit ci, it is removed from the list of
active circuits (line 15). Note that during this process
Algorithm 2 Compute total bandwidth for downloads
1: function CalcTotalBW(downloads)
2: start, end← GetT imeInterval(downloads)
3: bandwidth← 0
4: time← start
5: while time ≤ end do
6: circuits← GetActiveCircs(downloads, time)
7: CalcCircuitBW (circuits)
8: for circuit ∈ circuits do
9: bandwidth += circuit.bw
10: end for
11: time← time+ tick
12: end while
13: return bandwidth
14: end function
relay r will always end up with a bandwidth of 0, and
no circuits remaining in the list of active circuits will
contain r. Furthermore, any other relay that reached a
bandwidth value of 0 will also not be contained on any
circuit remaining in the active circuit list 1. This means
that we can never have a situation where a circuit has
a relay that is no longer active with a bandwidth of 0,
resulting in a circuit bandwidth of 0. The algorithm re-
peats this process, extracting the bottleneck relay and
updating relay and circuit bandwidths, until no active
circuits remain. An example of this this algorithm is
shown in Figure 1, highlighting which relay is selected
and how the circuit bandwidth is assigned and relay
bandwidth updated.
With an algorithm to compute the bandwidth
across all active circuits at a single point in time, we
can now compute the overall bandwidth consumption
across an entire set of downloads with assigned circuits,
which is outlined in Algorithm 2. First the algorithm re-
trieves the earliest start time and latest end time across
all downloads (line 2). With this we then iterate over
every “tick” between the start and end time (lines 5-
12), calculating the bandwidth across all active circuits
during that tick (lines 6-7). Then for each active circuit
we simply add the circuit bandwidth to a total band-
width counter (lines 8-10). This gives us a total band-
width value for a circuit to download mapping that can
be used as the fitness score for solutions in the genetic
algorithm. With this fitness score we can now run the
genetic algorithm across populations of circuit to down-
load mappings. The main parameters for the genetic
1 The proof for this is shown in AppendixA
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algorithm are the breed percentile b, indicating the top
b% of solutions to pick from when breeding, the elite top
e% of solutions that get copied over into the next gener-
ation, and the mutation probabilitym. For our purposes
a mutation can occur when we are selecting a circuit for
a single download, and we simply select a relay in the
circuit to be replaced when another randomly chosen
relay. 2.
4.2 Online Algorithm
The offline genetic algorithm has access to the entire
set of downloads when making circuit selection deci-
sions. We want to see how it compares to an online al-
gorithm, one that has to make circuit selection decisions
serially. This way it has global knowledge of which ac-
tive downloads are using which circuits, but has no idea
how long downloads will last and does not know when
future downloads start. While at first glance the online
problem might seem similar to traditional routing, there
are some problems using routing algorithm with respect
to circuit selection in Tor. Typically routing algorithms
depict the network as a graph in order to run efficient al-
gorithms in order to extract which paths to select. Since
relays, not links, are the resource constrained entities we
can invert the graph, with each relay consisting of and
in and out vertex and the edge between them repre-
senting the bandwidth of the relay. Additionally, since
in Tor there is a link between every relay, for each relay
we add an edge with infinite bandwidth connecting its
out vertex with every other relays in vertex. But now
if we want to run any traditional algorithms (e.g. max
flow), there is not way to impose the requirement that
all circuits must contain exactly three hops. In order to
do this we would have to create a graph of all potential
circuits, where each relay would have a separate vertex
for when it can be a guard, middle, and exit relay. But
not only does this explode our state space, there is now
no way to make sure that when a relay is used as a
guard, the available bandwidth on the middle and exit
vertex decreases correspondingly.
So while we cannot use traditional routing algo-
rithm for online circuit selection, we can borrow some
techniques from routing algorithms that share similar
goals. Specifically, for our online algorithm we borrow
2 Our experiments used parameters b = 0.2 and e = 0.1. Mu-
tations were only allowed during some of the experiments and
was set at m = 0.01.
techniques used in the delay-weighted capacity (DWC)
routing algorithm[38]. The goal of the DWC algorithm
is similar to what we wish to accomplish for circuit se-
lection, that is to find the path with the highest poten-
tial capacity. There are quite a few differences in the
original DWC algorithm and what we need to accom-
plish, mainly that we are given a set of circuits to choose
from and do not need to extract paths from a graph.
The key insight we can use from the DWC algorithm is
bottleneck identification and weight assignment. The al-
gorithm first extracts a set of least delay paths, then for
each path it identifies the bottleneck link, incrementing
the links weight by the inverse bandwidth of the link.
Then the DWC algorithm simply selects the path with
the lowest sum of weights across all links in the path.
By doing this it avoids the most critical links, those
that are the bottlenecks providing the lowest amount of
bandwidth.
To adopt the DWC routing algorithm for an on-
line circuit selection algorithm, we need a method for
identifying which relays are bottlenecks on active cir-
cuits. Algorithm 1, which estimates the bandwidth for
all active circuits, can very easily be adapted for this
purpose. Note that when we get the relay with the low-
est per circuit bandwidth (line 4), we know that this
relay is the bottleneck on each active circuit it appears
on. So when we iterate through those circuits (line 7)
and assign them the per circuit bandwidth value (line 8)
we can also update the weight for the relay. By simply
adding
r.weight← r.weight+ 1
circuitBW
after the circuit bandwidth assignment (between lines 8
and 9). Now when the function is done each circuit will
have a bandwidth and each relay will have a correspond-
ing DWC weight. So to run the DWC circuit selection
algorithm, we first iterate through the downloads in-
order based on the download start times. For each new
download we get the set of current active downloads
and their assigned circuits. We then run the updated
algorithm that calculates active circuit bandwidth and
relay DWC weights. Then, for each circuit we are con-
sidering for the new download, we calculate the circuit
weight as the sum of relay weights in the circuit. Then
the new download is assigned the circuit with the low-
est calculated weight. If there are multiple circuits with
the lowest weight we select the circuit with the highest
available bandwidth, defined as the minimum across all
relay available bandwidth values.
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Fig. 2. On the left, each circuit can achieve 10 MBps throughput,
resulting in a total of 20 MBps being delivered to the clients. On
the right, both original circuits must share bandwidth at the exit
nodes with a third circuit, reducing the throughput for each circuit
to 5 MBps and the total network throughput to 15 MBps, a drop in
network throughput even though we added a circuit to the network.
4.3 Circuit Sets
In both the offline and online circuit selection algo-
rithms, each download has a set of potential circuits
that can be selected from. For our experiments we con-
sider three potential circuit sets. The first is the original
10 circuits that were available during the initial vanilla
run. Along with extracting the fixed download start and
end times from a completed vanilla experiment, we also
record which circuits were available on the client when
each download started. This allows us to specifically fo-
cus on circuit selection, keeping relay selection identical
across all experiments. The second circuit set we con-
sider is the full set of all potential valid circuits. We
consider a circuit r1, r2, r3 valid if r3 is an actual exit
relay, and if r1 6= r2, r2 6= r3, and r1 6= r3. Note we do
not require that r1 actually has the guard flag set. This
is because while there are mechanisms internally in Tor
that prevent any use of a non-exit relay being used as an
exit relay, there is nothing stopping a client from using
a non-guard relay as their guard in a circuit. We also
remove any “duplicate” circuits that contain the same
relays, just in a different order. This is done since nei-
ther algorithm considers inter-relay latency, only relay
bandwidth, so there is no need to consider circuits with
identical relays.
The final circuit set we consider is the pruned circuit
set. The motivation behind the pruned set can be seen in
Figure 2. It shows that we can add an active circuit and
actually reduce the amount of bandwidth being pushed
through the Tor network. In the example shown it will
always be better to use one of the already active circuits
shown on the left instead of the new circuit seen on the
right side of the graphic. There are two main ideas be-
hind building the pruned circuit set: (1) when building
circuits always use non-exit relays for the guard and
middle if possible and (2) select relays with the highest
bandwidth. To build a circuit to add to the pruned set,
the algorithm first finds the exit relay with the highest
bandwidth. If none exist, the algorithm can stop as no
new circuits can be built. Once it has an exit, the al-
gorithm then searches for the non-exit relay with the
highest bandwidth, and this relay is used for the middle
relay in the circuit. If one is not found it searches the
remaining exit relays for the highest bandwidth relay to
use for the middle in the circuit. If it still cannot find a
relay, the algorithm stops as there are not enough relays
left to build another circuit. The search process for the
middle is replicated for the guard, again stopping if it
cannot find a suitable relay. Now that the circuit has
a guard, middle, and exit relay, the circuit is added to
the pruned circuit set and the algorithm calculates the
circuit bandwidth as the minimum bandwidth across all
relays in the circuit. Each relay then decrements its re-
lay bandwidth by the circuit bandwidth. Any relay that
now has a bandwidth of 0 is permanently removed from
the relay list. This is repeated until the algorithm can
no longer build valid circuits. 3
4.4 Results
In this section we explore the performance of our offline
genetic and online DWC circuit selection algorithms. To
start we first configured and ran a large scale experiment
running vanilla Tor with no modifications, while using
the default client model. The results of this run were
then used to generate an experiment using the fixed
download model, where each download had the same
start and end times that was seen in the vanilla experi-
ment. We also extracted the original circuit sets for each
download. These download times are then fed into both
algorithms, along with which circuit sets to use, which
then output a circuit selection for each download.
We ran the offline genetic and online DWC algo-
rithms once for each circuit set, resulting in mappings
of fixed downloads to circuits. Large scale experiments
were run using each of the outputted circuit selections,
and the results were compared to the original vanilla
Tor experimental run. Recall since we are using the
fixed download client model, the only metric we are
concerned with is network usage, in this case the to-
tal client download bandwidth during the experiment.
Figures 3a and 3b shows the total client bandwidth
achieved with the genetic and DWC algorithms respec-
3 The pseudocode for this algorithm is shown in Appendix B.
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(c) Relay Capacity
Fig. 3. Total client bandwidth when using the offline and online circuit selection while changing the set of available circuits, along with
the relay bandwidth capacity of the best results from both algorithms.
tively. The first thing to note is that both algorithms
were able to produce relay and circuit selections that
improved bandwidth by 72%, with median client band-
width jumping from 86 MBps up to 147 MBps. To see
why we can look at relay capacity seen in Figure 3c.
This looks at the percent of bandwidth being used on
a relay compared to their configured BandwidthRate.
Note that this can go higher than 100% because Tor
also has a BandwidthBurstRate that allows the relay
to temporarily send more than the BandwidthRate over
short periods of time. This shows us that in the best per-
forming DWC and genetic algorithms, half of the time
relays are using 90% or more of their configured band-
width, which was only happening about 20% of the time
in vanilla Tor. This shows that the algorithms were able
to take advantage of resources that were otherwise left
idle in vanilla Tor.
Interesting while both algorithms were able to
achieve near identical maximum results, these came
from different circuit sets. The genetic algorithm
achieved its best results when using the pruned set while
the DWC algorithm performed best with the full set
of valid circuits. Furthermore, when the genetic algo-
rithm used the full set and the DWC algorithm used the
pruned set, they both actually performed worse when
compared to vanilla Tor. We suspect that when using
the full circuit set, the genetic algorithm gets stuck in a
local maximum that it is unable to escape, and using the
pruned circuit set prevents the algorithm from entering
one of these suboptimal local maximums. When the al-
gorithms were restricted to the original circuit sets both
algorithms were able to improve performance compared
to vanilla Tor. The offline genetic algorithm was able to
increase client bandwidth to 111 MBps, while the online
DWC algorithm saw performance results close to what
was achieved with the full circuit set, with median client
bandwidth at 138 MBps compared to 147 MBps with
the full circuit set.
While the genetic algorithm serves as a lower bound
on an optimal offline solution, given the near identical
results seen when using the pruned circuit set in the
genetic algorithm compared with the full circuit set in
the DWC algorithm, we believe the online DWC algo-
rithm is operating fairly close to an optimal solution,
resulting in a much better allocation of resources. Most
likely to see even more increased performance we would
need to either increase the bandwidth resources avail-
able (e.g. add more relays or increase the bandwidth of
existing relays), or add more clients to the network that
can consume any remaining idle resources.
5 Decentralized Circuit Selection
In the previous section we saw that when making circuit
selection in a centralized fashion, with a global view of
the network, we were able to see large performance in-
creases with resources being used much more efficiently.
In this section we look at a decentralized solution that
borrows techniques from the online DWC algorithm, al-
lowing for clients to make smarter circuit selections lo-
cally. The main insight from the online DWC algorithm
outlined in Section 4.2 is that we want to avoid bottle-
neck relays, particularly if they are low-bandwidth bot-
tlenecks. The obvious advantage from using a central-
ized approach is we have a global view of active circuits
and can accurately estimate where the bottlenecks are
and how much bandwidth they are providing per circuit.
In a decentralized setting no one entity has this global
view that can determine who is and is not a bottleneck
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on each circuit. So instead we want a method for relays
themselves to estimate which circuits they are a bot-
tleneck on. With estimates of bottleneck circuits, they
can locally compute their DWC weight and leak it to
clients, allowing clients to make more intelligent circuit
selection decisions.
5.1 Local Weight Computation
The main challenge in having relays locally compute
their DWC weight is having the relays estimate which
circuits they are the bottleneck on. To calculate bottle-
neck circuits, we make three observations: (1) to be a
bottleneck on any circuit the relay’s bandwidth should
be fully consumed (2) all bottleneck circuits should be
sending more cells than non-bottleneck circuits, and (3)
the number of cells being sent on bottleneck circuits
should be fairly uniform. The last point is due to con-
gestion control built into Tor, where the sending rate
on a circuit should converge to the capacity of the bot-
tleneck. So the two main things we need is a method
for calculating the bandwidth of a circuit and a way to
classify circuits as bottleneck or non-bottleneck based
on their bandwidth value.
While calculating circuit bandwidth might seem
easy, we need to be careful to treat bulk and web circuits
equally. Bulk clients continuously send data through the
circuit, so those should always be at or close to capac-
ity. Web clients are more bursty, sending traffic in short
periods and resting for an unknown amount of time. In
order to assign a circuit a bandwidth we consider two
parameters. First is the bandwidth window, in which we
keep track of all traffic sent on a circuit for the past w
seconds. The other parameters is the bandwidth gran-
ularity, a sliding window of g that we scan over the w
second bandwidth window to find the maximum number
of cells transferred during any g period. That maximum
value is then assigned as the circuit bandwidth. With
circuits assigned a bandwidth value we need a way to
cluster the circuits into bottleneck and non-bottleneck
groups. For this we look at three different clustering
methods.
Jenks Natural Breaks: The Jenks natural breaks
[19] clustering algorithm attempts to cluster one-
dimensional data into classes that minimizes the in-
class variance. The function takes in a one-dimensional
array of data and the n classes that the data
should be clustered into. It returns the breaks
[b1, b2), [b2, b3), ..., [bn, bn+1] and a goodness of variance
fit (GVF) var ∈ [0, 1], where higher variances indicate
Algorithm 3 Head/Tail clustering algorithm
1: function HeadTail(data, threshold)
2: m← sum(data)/len(data)
3: head← {d ∈ data|d ≥ m}
4: if len(head)/len(data) < threshold then
5: head← HeadTail(head, threshold)
6: end if
7: return head
8: end function
better fits. For clustering circuits we can use the Jenks
algorithm in two different ways. First is to cluster the
data into 2 classes, with circuits in the [b1, b2) range
classified as non-bottlenecks and those in [b2, b3] classi-
fied as bottlenecks. Second is we can keep incrementing
the number of classes we cluster the circuits into un-
til the GVF value passes some threshold τ . Once the
threshold is passed we then classify all circuits in the
[bn, bn+1] range as bottlenecks and everyone else as non-
bottlenecks.
Head/Tail: The head/tail clustering algorithm [20] is
useful when the underlying data has a long tail, which
could be useful for bottleneck identification, as we ex-
pect to have a tight clustering around the bottlenecks
with other circuits randomly distributed amongst the
lower bandwidth values. The algorithm first splits the
data into two sets, the tail set containing all values less
than the arithmetic mean, and everything greater to or
equal to the mean is put in the head set. If the percent
of values that ended up in the head set is less than some
threshold, the process is repeated using the head set as
the new data set. Once the threshold is passed the func-
tion returns the very last head set as the head cluster
of the data. The pseudocode for this algorithm is shown
in Algorithm 3. For bottleneck identification we simply
pass in the circuit bandwidth data and the head cluster
returned contains all the bottleneck circuits.
Kernel Density Estimator: The idea behind the ker-
nel density estimator [25, 27] is we are going to try and
fit a multimodal distribution based on a Gaussian kernel
to the circuits. Instead of using the bandwidth estimate
for each circuit, the estimator takes as input the entire
bandwidth history seen across all circuits, giving the es-
timator more data points to build a more accurate den-
sity estimate. For the kernel bandwidth we initially use
the square root of the mean of all values. Once we have a
density we compute the set of local minima {m1, ...,mn}
and classify every circuit with bandwidth above mn as
a bottleneck. If the resulting density estimate is uni-
modal and we do not have any local minima, we repeat
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this process, halving the kernel bandwidth until we get
a multimodal distribution.
With a method to calculate circuit bandwidth and
identify bottleneck circuits, the relay can calculate their
weight in the same way described in Section 4.2; iterate
over each bottleneck circuit and add the inverse of the
bandwidth to the local weight calculation. This infor-
mation can be leaked to clients, allowing them to select
the circuit with the lowest weight summed across all
relays in the circuit.
5.2 Implementation
Since the decentralized algorithm needs real time band-
width information, we implement the algorithm directly
in Tor with clients making circuit selection decisions as
downloads start. So while we had to use the fixed down-
load client model in Section 4 in order to precompute
circuit selection, for the decentralized algorithm we can
use the default client model where clients have a sin-
gle start time and web clients pause randomly between
downloads they perform. While this means they algo-
rithms need to run in real time, we can now allows in-
clude the time to first byte and file download time in
our evaluation metrics.
To incorporate the decentralized algorithm in Tor
we first implemented the local weight calculation
method described in Section 5.1. As discussed pre-
viously the method has three parameters, bandwidth
granularity g, bandwidth window w, and which cluster-
ing method to use. For each circuit relays keep a count
of how many cells were read and written in each 100
millisecond interval over the past w seconds. Then to
determine the circuit bandwidth it iterates through the
circuit history to determine the maximum number of
cells sent over a g millisecond period. The circuit band-
width values are then clustered into bottleneck circuits,
with the weight calculated as the sum of inverse circuit
bandwidth across all bottlenecks. Now that a relay can
compute their own DWCweight, they need a way to leak
this information to clients. For this we implement a new
cell called a gossip cell. Each relay records its weight in
a gossip cell and appends it on the downstream queue
to the client for each circuit it has. Since the cell is en-
crypted no other relay will be able to modify the weight.
To prevent gossip cells from causing congestion, relays
send the gossips cells on circuits every 5 seconds based
on the circuit ID; specifically when now() ≡ circID
mod 5. For clients we modified the circuit_get_best
function to select circuits with the lowest weight, using
circuit bandwidth as the tie breaker. While compiling a
list of “acceptable” circuits that Tor normally selected
from, we additionally keep track of the minimal circuit
weight across the acceptable circuits, and additionally
filter out circuits with larger weight values. If there are
multiple circuits remaining after this, we iterate through
the remaining circuits selecting circuits with the highest
circuit bandwidth, defined as the minimum advertised
relay bandwidth across all relays in the circuit. If after
this step we still have more than one circuit available we
default to Tor’s circuit selection among the remaining
circuits.
For the centralized DWC algorithm we can no
longer precompute circuit selection since we are using
the default client model, so we need a way to run the
centralized algorithm during the experiment as clients
start downloads. To accomplish this we introduce a new
central authority node which clients will need to query
for circuit selection decisions. When a client starts the
central authority connects to the client using the Tor
control protocol. It disables the client from making cir-
cuit selections decisions locally, and then listens on the
CIRC and STREAM events. With the CIRC events the cen-
tral authority know what circuits are available on every
client in the network. The STREAM events then notify
the central authority when a client begins a download,
at which time the central authority can select which
circuit the client has that they should use for the new
download. Through the STREAM events the central au-
thority is also notified when the stream has completed
so the central authority can remove the circuit assigned
to the stream from the active circuit list. With this the
central authority obtains a global view of the network
with knowledge of every current active circuit. So it can
use the Algorithm 1 discussed in Section 4.2 to com-
pute which relays are bottlenecks on each circuit, update
the weight of relays accordingly, and select the lowest
weighted circuit that clients have available.
5.3 Results
With the various parameters and clustering methods
available to the decentralized algorithm, the first thing
we are interested in is which parameters results in the
most accurate bottleneck estimation. Since we are com-
paring the decentralized algorithm against the central-
ized DWC algorithm, we will use the central authori-
ties bottleneck estimation as ground truth. To make the
comparison we configured an experiment to run with
the central authority making circuit selections. Every
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Bandwidth Granularity 100 ms 1 second
Bandwidth Window 1s 2s 5s 10s 1s 2s 5s 10s
Jenks Two 1.67 1.79 3.56 8.69 1.80 2.39 5.28 13.25
Jenks Best 1.11 1.14 1.91 3.87 1.00 1.18 2.25 4.70
Head/Tail 0.74 0.92 1.66 4.36 0.90 1.13 2.45 6.14
KernelDensity 0.81 0.82 0.85 0.93 0.79 0.79 0.95 1.62
Table 1. The bottleneck clustering methods mean square error across varying bandwidth granularity and window parameters, with red
values indicating scores less than weighted random estimator.
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Fig. 4. Download times and client bandwidth compared across circuit selection in vanilla Tor, decentralized, and centralized algorithms.
time the central authority selects a circuit for a client it
outputs the bottleneck estimation for every relay. Ad-
ditionally, during the run all relays periodically output
the entire 10 second bandwidth history for every circuit
it is on. With this information we can compute which
circuits every relay would have classified as a bottleneck
depending on the parameters used. For comparing es-
timates, every time the central authority outputs their
bottleneck figures, every relay that outputs their circuit
history within 10 simulated milliseconds will have their
local bottleneck estimate compared to the estimate pro-
duced by the central authority.
We are interested in the combination of parame-
ters and clustering methods that minimizes the mean-
squared error between the central authority and local re-
lay bottleneck estimations. Table 1 shows the results of
the different clustering methods with bandwidth granu-
larity set at either 100 millisecond or 1 second, and with
the bandwidth window varying between 1,2,5 and 10
seconds. For comparison we created a weighted random
estimator that simply randomly selects from the entire
set of estimates produced by the central authority. The
weighted random estimator produced a mean-squared
error of 1.33, which was better than almost half of all
configurations. For example the Jenks two class cluster-
ing method consistently produced results worse than the
weighted random estimator no matter what parameters
were used. Across all clustering methods larger band-
width windows resulted in higher mean-squared errors.
This indicates that circuits that were inactive (and thus
excluded from the central authorities calculation) were
still being assigned a high bandwidth value and clus-
tered into the bottleneck group. Interestingly, while the
kernel density estimator produced the best results on
average, the overall best parameter configuration was
using the head/tail estimator with bandwidth granular-
ity g = 100ms and bandwidth window w = 1s.
Using these parameters we ran an experiment with
the decentralized DWC algorithm, along with vanilla
Tor and centralized DWC. Note that every experiment
was configured to have relays send gossip cells every
5 seconds in addition with including a central author-
ity connected to every client. In non-centralized exper-
iments, when a download starts the central authority
tells the client to select a circuit themselves instead
of making the selection for them, and we had vanilla
Tor ignore relay weights when making circuit selection.
This is done to ensure that any latency and band-
width overhead is identical across experiments and the
only difference is the circuit selection algorithm being
used. The results of all three experiments are shown in
Figure 4. The centralized experiments show across the
board improvements in every metric compared to vanilla
Tor, with clients experiencing almost 20% higher band-
width. While the decentralized experiment produced re-
sults slightly under the centralized, we still see improve-
ments compared to vanilla Tor. Figure 4d shows client
bandwidth still increasing 8% with the decentralized al-
gorithm. Bulk clients in both the centralized and de-
centralized experiments achieved between 5% and 30%
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Fig. 5. Download times and client bandwidth when using local decentralized circuit selection, varying the number of available circuits to
select from.
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Fig. 6. Download times and client bandwidth when using centralized circuit selection, varying the number of available circuits to select
from.
faster downloads. While all web clients saw faster down-
load times in the centralized experiment, the results
from the decentralized experiment are slightly more
mixed. 70% of web client downloads performed just as
fast as they did in the centralized experiment, with 15%
falling in between centralized and vanilla Tor. The final
15% of web client downloads experienced just slightly
longer download times, with 1-2% increases compared
to vanilla Tor. Time to first byte shown in Figure 4a
shows the worst performance in the decentralized exper-
iments, with roughly 25% of downloads experiencing an
extra 1-2 seconds to receive their first byte. This could
be caused by the fact that there is a delay in a relay
updating its weight and all clients receiving it, causing
clients to select relays that are temporarily congested
resulting in poor times to first byte.
Along with the discussed parameters for the local
weight computation, both the centralized and decentral-
ized have an implicit parameter, the number of active
circuits client should attempt to maintain. By default
Tor clients keep around 10 active circuits it can select
from. This is to make sure that there is always some
circuit that can be used for downloads, and the client
doesn’t have to incur the 5-10 second overhead of circuit
creation when a download starts. For both the central-
ized and decentralized algorithms, having more circuits
available to select from could increase performance. As
was seen in Section 4.2 when we had the full set of cir-
cuits to select from, the centralized DWC algorithm pro-
duced the best results. To test this we configured the
experiments to have clients maintain a set of 10, 25,
and 50 available circuits. Results for these experiments
are shown in Figures 5 and 6. Across almost every met-
ric the decentralized algorithm saw worse results when
using more circuits. This is particularly evident looking
at client bandwidth in Figure 5d. When selecting from
50 circuits only about 40% of the time clients achieved
a higher bandwidth, and using 25 circuits always re-
sulted in worse performing clients. This is most likely
due to the fact that increasing the number of circuits
that clients create is interfering with the bottleneck clas-
sification algorithm, resulting in worse performance. For
the centralized algorithm all download times remained
fairly identical no matter how many circuits were avail-
able. The only metric that saw any difference was client
bandwidth shown in Figure 6d. Here we see increasing
the number of available circuits to 25 and 50 achieves an
increase of 8% and 19% in client bandwidth compared to
using only 10 circuits. Considering that no other met-
rics improved when increasing this is most likely due
to overhead from maintaining circuits that is not being
controlled for.
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5.4 Privacy Analysis
With the addition of gossip cells and the new decen-
tralized circuit selection protocol, there are some av-
enues that could be abused in an attempt to reduce
client anonymity. The first major concern is that since
the gossip cells purposefully leak information about the
internal state of the relays, that this could open up a
new side channel where an adversary can correlate client
activity to change in information leaked to determine
which relays are used by a client. The second issue is
the increase in percent of circuits that relays end up
being selected on, both from the change in selection al-
gorithm and also due to the fact that an adversarial
relay could abuse the protocol. This can be done by ly-
ing about their own weight or artificially inflating other
relays weight, thereby increasing the chance they will
be selected allowing them to observe a higher portion of
the Tor network. In this section we examine the impact
of some of these privacy issues.
5.4.1 Information Leakage
The first issue is that relays advertising their local
weight calculation could leak some information to an
adversary. Mittal et al.[21] showed how an adversary
could use throughput measurements to identify bottle-
neck relays in circuits. Relay weight values could be used
similarly, where an adversary could attempt to correlate
start and stop times of connections with the weight val-
ues of potential bottleneck relays. To examine how much
information is leaked by the weight values, every time
a relay sent a GOSSIP cell we recorded the weight of the
relay and the number of active circuits using the relay.
Then for every two consecutive GOSSIP cells sent by a
relay we then recorded the difference in weight and num-
ber of active circuits, which should give us a good idea of
how well the change in these two values are correlated
over a short period of time. Figure 7a shows the dis-
tribution of weight differences across various changes in
clients actively using the relay. Since we are interested in
times when the relay is a bottleneck on new circuits, we
excluded times when the weight difference was 0 as this
is indicative that the relay was not a bottleneck on any
of the new circuits. This shows an almost nonexistent
correlation between the two metrics, where we are just
as likely to see a rise or drop in weight after more bottle-
neck circuits start using a relay. In the situation similar
to the one outlined in [21] where an adversary is at-
tempting to identify bottleneck relays used in a circuit,
we are particularly interested in the situation where the
number of active circuits using the relay as a bottleneck
increases by 1. If there were large (maybe temporary)
changes noticeable to an adversary they could identify
the bottleneck relay. But as we can see in Figure 7a the
distribution of weight changes when client difference is
1 is very large, meaning it would be almost impossible
to identify the bottleneck relay by just monitoring relay
weights.
5.4.2 Relay Usage Changes
Since relays are still selected at random weighted by
their bandwidth, over the long term relay usage should
remain the same in vanilla Tor and when using the de-
centralized DWC circuit selection algorithm. Over the
short term this might change though, since circuits are
selected based on network information that could cause
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Fig. 8. (a) attackers bandwidth and targets weight when an adversary is running the denial of service attack (b) number of clients using
the target for a circuit (c) number of downloads completed by clients using the target relay before and after attack is started, shown
both for vanilla Tor and using decentralized circuit selection
peeks in relay usage. In addition to short term fluctu-
ations, an active adversarial relay could lie about their
DWC weight, consistently telling clients they have a
weight of 0, increasing the chances clients select circuits
that the adversaries relay lies on. These changes could
allow a relay to increase their view of the network with-
out having to actually provide more bandwidth, poten-
tially reducing anonymity of clients using Tor.
To determine the effect that the decentralized al-
gorithm has on relay usage, we extracted all circuits
selected by clients during each experiment. In addition,
for the experiment running the decentralized circuit se-
lect algorithm we had clients output every circuit it
considered, along with each relays weight. This allows
us to perform a static analysis of which circuits would
have been selected if a single relay was lying about their
weight. In each situation we are interested in the change
in the percent of circuits selected containing a specific
relay, showing how much more of the network an ad-
versary might be able to see. Figure 7b shows the CDF
of the change in percent of circuits experienced by each
relay. It shows the difference when going from vanilla
Tor to regular decentralized DWC, in addition to go-
ing from vanilla Tor to decentralized DWC when relays
lie about their weight. While the increases are gener-
ally small, the largest changes come from simply using
the new decentralized algorithm, with 80% of relays see-
ing a small drop in the percent of circuits selected they
end up on. Even the relays that see an increase almost
never end up seeing more than 1% additional circuits.
Furthermore there is very little gained when relays start
lying about their weight, with most increases being an
extra 0.1-0.2%. Figure 7c shows the 20 relays with the
largest gains. These are the highest bandwidth relays in
the network, providing 39% of the total available band-
width. Here we see in the most extreme case, the very
highest bandwidth relay could view 9% more circuits
than they would have seen in vanilla Tor over the short
term. Over the long term however, the only real gain
coming from the relay lying about their weight would
be capped at about 3-4%.
5.4.3 Denial of Service
While adversarial relays are limited in the number of ex-
tra circuits they can be placed on by lying about their
weight, they still could have the ability to reduce the
chances that other relays are selected. To achieve this
they would need to artificially inflate the weight of other
relays in the network, preventing clients from selecting
circuits that the target relays appear on. Recall that
the local weight calculation is based on how many bot-
tleneck circuits the relay estimates they are on. This
means that an adversary cannot simply just create in-
active circuits through the relay to inflate their weight,
those circuits would never be labeled as bottleneck. So
to actually cause the weight to increase the adversary
needs to actually send data through the circuits. To test
the effectiveness, we configured an experiment to create
250 one-hop circuits through the target relay. After 15
minutes the one-hop circuits were activated, download-
ing as much data as they could. Note that we want as
many circuits through the relay as possible to make their
weight as large as possible. The relay weight is summed
across all bottleneck circuits,
∑
bw(ci)−1. If we have
n one-hop circuits through a relay of bandwidth bw,
each circuit will have a bandwidth of roughly bwn , so the
weight on the relay will be
∑n
1
(
bw
n
)−1 = n2bw .
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Figure 8a looks at the weight of the target relay
along with how much bandwidth the attacker is using,
with the shaded region noting when the attack is ac-
tive. We see that the attacker is able to push through
close to the maximum bandwidth that the relay can
handle, around 35 MB/s. When the circuits are active
the weight spikes to almost 100 times what it was previ-
ously. Figure 8b shows the number of circuits the target
is actively on. After the attack is started the number
plummets to almost 0, down from the 30-40 it was pre-
viously on. But while the attack does succeed in inflating
the weight of the target, note that the adversary has to
fully saturate the bandwidth of the target. Doing this
in vanilla Tor will have has almost the same effect, es-
sentially running a denial of service by consuming all
the available bandwidth. Figure 8c looks at the number
of completed downloads using the target relay in both
vanilla Tor and when using the decentralized circuit se-
lection. Both experiments see the number of successful
downloads drop to 0 while the attack is running. So even
though the addition of the relay weight adds another
mechanism that can be used to run a denial of service
attack, the avenue (saturating bandwidth) is the same.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we explore the price of anarchy in Tor
by examining how using offline and online algorithms
for circuit selection is able to significantly increase per-
formance to end clients. These algorithms are able to
more efficiently utilize network resources, resulting in
almost twice as much bandwidth being consumed. Fur-
thermore, since the offline and online produced almost
identical results, it suggests that that network utiliza-
tion was near or at capacity. In addition we adapt the
online DWC algorithm to create a decentralized version,
where relays themselves are able to estimate calcula-
tions made by a central authority. While the results are
not quite as dramatic, the decentralized algorithm was
still able to achieve 20-25% higher bandwidth consump-
tion when compared to vanilla Tor. Finally we analyze
the potential loss in anonymity when using the decen-
tralized algorithm, both against a passive and active
adversary.
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A Bandwidth Algorithm Proof
Let R be the relay selected with B bandwidth and C
circuits. Let R′ be a different relay with B′ bandwidth
and C ′ circuits. By definition R is selected such that
B
C ≤ B
′
C′ . When iterating through the C circuits let n be
the number that R′ is on. Note that this means that n ≤
C ′. After the circuits have been iterated through and
operations performed, R′ will have B′− BC ·n bandwidth
left with C ′ − n circuits.
Assume that R′ has 0 bandwidth afterwards, so B′−
B
C ·n = 0. We want to show this means that R′ is on no
more circuits so that C ′ − n = 0. We have
B′ − B
C
· n = 0⇒ B′ = B
C
· n⇒ n = B
′ · C
B
So that means that the number of circuits R′ is left on
is
C ′ − n = C ′ − C − B
′ · C
B
= B · C
′
B
− B
′ · C
B
= B · C
′ −B′ · C
B
However, R was picked such that
B
C
≤ B
′
C ′
⇒ B · C ′ ≤ B′ · C ⇒ B · C ′ −B′ · C ≤ 0
This gives us
C ′ − n = B · C
′ −B′ · C
B
≤ 0
since we know B > 0 and
n ≤ C ′ ⇒ 0 ≤ C ′ − n
which implies that 0 ≤ C ′ − n ≤ 0⇒ C ′ − n = 0.
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B Circuit Pruning Algorithm
Algorithm 4 Generate pruned circuit set
1: function BuildPrunedSet(relays)
2: circuits← List()
3: while TRUE do
4: if relays.len() > 3 then
5: break
6: end if
7: if relays.numExits() > 0 then
8: break
9: end if
10: relays.sortByBW ()
11: exit← relays.getF irstExit()
12: middle← relays.getF irstNonExit()
13: guard← relays.getF irstNonExit()
14: if middle == Null then
15: middle← relays.getF irstExit()
16: end if
17: if guard == Null then
18: guard← relays.getF irstExit()
19: end if
20: circuits.append(guard,middle, exit)
21: bw ← min(guard.bw,middle.bw, exitbw)
22: guard.bw ← guard.bw − bw
23: middle.bw ← middle.bw − bw
24: exit.bw ← exit.bw − bw
25: if guard.bw == 0 then
26: relays.remove(guard)
27: end if
28: if middle.bw == 0 then
29: relays.remove(middle)
30: end if
31: if exit.bw == 0 then
32: relays.remove(exit)
33: end if
34: end while
35: return circuits
36: end function
